03 Oct prescription of the crime
The prescription of the crime constitutes one of the most relevant institutions and, at the same time, more complex than Italian criminal law, since it affects the relationship between the State's need to prosecute and ascertain crimes and that of preventing a person from remaining indefinitely exposed to the possibility of being subjected to criminal proceedings for an act committed many years before. The prescription discipline has undergone, over the last few years, numerous legislative changes which have profoundly affected the functioning of the institute, determining a system in which, to understand whether a certain crime is prescribed, it is not sufficient to know the punishment provided for by the individual incriminating law, but it is necessary to preliminarily identify the date of commission of the crime e, subsequently, apply the regulations in force at that particular time, taking into account any causes of suspension and interruption of the term. The starting point is represented by art. 157 c.p., according to which the statute of limitations extinguishes the crime after the time corresponding to the maximum statutory penalty established by law has elapsed and in any case a period of no less than six years if it is a crime and four years if it is a contravention. The provision also establishes specific rules for calculating the term, specifying that, for the purposes of determining the time necessary to prescribe, reference must be made to the penalty established by law for the committed or attempted crime, without taking into account the decrease resulting from mitigating circumstances and the increase resulting from aggravating circumstances, except in the cases expressly provided for by the same regulation. The system is therefore built, generally, on the abstract gravity of the crime, identified through the maximum penalty provided by law, with the guarantee of a minimum term of six years for crimes and four years for contraventions. The rationale of the institute is traditionally identified in a plurality of needs. On one side, the passage of time determines a progressive weakening of the State's interest in the investigation and punishment of facts dating back; on the other, as the years pass, the possibility of correctly reconstructing events weakens, sources of evidence deteriorate, The witnesses' memory weakens and it becomes progressively more difficult to guarantee a fully reliable assessment. The statute of limitations also performs a function linked to the principle of reasonable duration of the proceedings, more generally, to the need that the State's punitive response does not remain indefinitely suspended in time. Not all crimes, however, are subject to prescription according to the same rules. L’art. 157 c.p. in fact, it provides for particular disciplines for certain categories of crimes and establishes that the statute of limitations does not expire for crimes for which the law provides for a life sentence. The determination of the term must therefore be carried out through the examination of the individual incriminating case and the statutory penalty envisaged at the time of the commission of the crime.. A fundamental element of the discipline is represented by the starting date of the deadline. Pursuant to art. 158 c.p., the statute of limitations expires, for the crime committed, from the day of consumption; for the attempted crime, from the day on which the culprit's activity ceased; for the permanent crime, from the day on which the stay ended. The correct identification of the dies a quo therefore takes on decisive importance, because even a shift of a few days or months can cause significant consequences in the calculation of the prescription. The issue becomes particularly delicate in crimes characterized by a plurality of conduct, by a prolonged duration over time or by a permanent or habitual structure. In fact, it is not always sufficient to identify the date of the first illicit behavior, the moment in which the crime must be considered legally committed must be established. Once the initial term has been identified, it is necessary to verify whether during the proceedings events have occurred that are suitable for suspending or interrupting the prescription. The distinction between suspension and interruption is fundamental. Suspension determines, generally, a temporary halt to the running of the term: the cause of suspension ceased, the term starts again from the point at which it stopped. The interruption, instead, determines a different effect, because it involves the loss of time already spent and the start of a new deadline, according to the rules established by the articles. 160 e 161 c.p. L’art. 159 c.p. regulates the causes of suspension of the prescription and provides specific hypotheses in which the course of the term remains suspended. Among these, situations in which the proceedings cannot continue for reasons established by law are of particular importance, as well as the hypotheses expressly identified by the legislator. However, the suspension regulations have undergone important changes over the last few years and must be reconstructed taking into account the date of commission of the crime. Also the art. 160 c.p. regulates the causes of interruption of the prescription, identifying the procedural acts that produce this effect. Among the interruptive acts they can take on importance, depending on the regulations applicable to the individual proceeding, the interrogation of the accused, the invitation to present himself to the public prosecutor, the judge's order validating the arrest or detention, interrogation before the public prosecutor or judge, the request for indictment, the summons to trial and the conviction sentence. Jurisprudence has clarified that the causes of interruption can also produce effects on other participants in the same crime, according to the conditions set out in the art. 161 c.p. The Court of Cassation recently reiterated, with sentence no. 40880 of the 2025, that the causes of interruption of the statute of limitations can have effect on all those who committed the crime, even when the procedural position of the various subjects has not been evaluated at the same time. A particularly important aspect concerns the limit on the effects of the interruption. L’art. 161 c.p. in fact, it predicts that, unless otherwise established, the interruption of the prescription cannot lead to an extension of the time necessary to prescribe by more than a quarter of the ordinary time provided for by the art.. 157 c.p. The general rule must, however, be coordinated with the numerous exceptions provided for by the law for certain categories of crimes, for which the maximum increase may be different. Even from this point of view, therefore, the calculation of the limitation period requires examination of the specific disputed case and the possible presence of special regulations. The complexity of the current system derives above all from the profound legislative changes that have occurred in recent years. The regulation of prescription has in fact been affected by the law 5 December 2005, n. 251, by law 23 June 2017, n. 103, by law 9 January 2019, n. 3, and subsequently by law 27 September 2021, n. 134, as part of the reform linked to the criminal trial and the so-called Cartabia reform. These changes have not produced a single regime applicable without distinction to all proceedings, but they determined the need to identify the applicable discipline based on the date of commission of the crime. The jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation has repeatedly underlined the need to distinguish the different temporal regimes. In particular, for crimes committed up to 2 August 2017 the regulations resulting from law no. apply. 251 of the 2005; for crimes committed by 3 August 2017 al 31 December 2019 the regime introduced by law no. applies. 103 of the 2017, so-called Orlando reform; for crimes committed from 1 January 2020 the changes introduced by law no. apply. 3 of the 2019, subsequently coordinated with the regulations introduced by law no. 134 of the 2021 and the Cartabia reform. The Court of Cassation clarified that the different disciplines must be reconstructed according to the date of commission of the crime and that, to determine the concretely applicable regulation, it is necessary to keep distinct the different legislative interventions that have occurred over time. The reform introduced by law no. 3 of the 2019, so-called Bonafede law, he had predicted, for crimes committed from 1 January 2020, the suspension of the course of the statute of limitations from the pronouncement of the first degree sentence or the sentencing decree until the date of enforceability of the sentence that defined the judgment or the irrevocability of the sentencing decree. The system was subsequently modified by law no. 134 of the 2021, which repealed this regulation and introduced the art. 161-to c.p. The provision establishes that the limitation period definitively ceases with the pronouncement of the first instance sentence, except in the case in which the sentence is annulled by regressing the proceedings to the first instance or to an earlier stage, in which case the limitation period resumes its course from the date of the definitive annulment ruling. The consequence of this change is particularly important: for crimes subject to the regime introduced starting from 1 January 2020, the statute of limitations for the crime does not normally continue to run during the appeal and cassation proceedings after the pronouncement of the first degree sentence. The legislator has in fact linked the introduction of a different procedural mechanism to the cessation of the limitation period, represented by the inadmissibility of criminal proceedings due to exceeding the maximum duration of appeal proceedings, governed by art. 344-twice c.p.p. Prescription and inadmissibility must therefore be kept strictly distinct, since they are two different institutes, governed by different rules and operating at different times. In fact, the statute of limitations concerns the extinction of the crime as a result of the passage of time according to the conditions established by the penal code; the inadmissibility provided for by the art. 344-twice c.p.p. it instead concerns the duration of appeal proceedings and operations, for the crimes to which the provision is applicable, when the appeal or cassation judgment is not resolved within the terms established by law. For appeal proceedings the ordinary term is two years, while for the cassation judgment it is one year, starting according to the methods established by the art. 344-Twice c.p.p., with the possibility of extension in cases provided for by law. The Court of Cassation recently reiterated, with sentence no. 33056 of September 8th 2026, that the appeal judge must keep the two levels distinct: the statute of limitations must be verified with reference to the period between the commission of the crime and the first degree sentence, while inadmissibility concerns the duration of the subsequent appeal proceedings. This distinction represents one of the most important points for understanding the current system. Say that “a process is prescribed” after a first instance sentence it is not, indeed, technically correct when applying the regime in which the course of the limitation period ceased with this ruling. In such a situation it is necessary to check, on one side, if the crime was already time-barred before the first degree sentence e, on the other, if the subsequent appeal proceeding exceeded the deadlines set by the art. 344-twice c.p.p. Another issue of particular importance concerns the succession of laws over time. The prescription, being an institution of substantive criminal law, is subject to the principle of legality and the rules on the succession of criminal laws over time provided for by the art. 2 c.p., with the peculiarities deriving from the specific transitional provisions introduced by the legislator in the various reforms. Case law has made it clear that not all changes that have occurred in recent years can be treated in the same way. With reference, eg, to the succession between the Orlando and Bonafede disciplines, the laws have established specific deadlines linked to the date of commission of the crime; otherwise, the introduction of the art. 161-to c.p. has determined a phenomenon of succession of criminal laws over time which must be evaluated in light of the art. 2 c.p. The Supreme Court also highlighted that, precisely as a result of the succession of reforms, Different prescription regimes coexist today, to be identified based on the date of the event. The problem takes on particular importance in professional practice, because the simple knowledge of the abstract term provided for by the art. 157 c.p. it is not sufficient to establish whether a crime is actually time-barred. First of all, it is necessary to identify the date of commission of the crime, determine the maximum penalty provided for in the applicable case, establish the ordinary limitation period, check for any causes of suspension, identify the interruptive acts and calculate the effects produced by each of them, verify the possible application of special disciplines e, in the end, identify the applicable time regime based on the date of commission of the act. Only through this procedure is it possible to determine with sufficient precision the date on which the prescription expires. It is also necessary to distinguish the prescription of the crime from the prescription of the sentence. These are completely different institutions. The prescription of the crime occurs before the criminal proceedings conclude with an irrevocable sentence and determines the extinction of the crime according to the conditions established by law. The prescription of the sentence, however, concerns a sentence already inflicted with an irrevocable sentence and is linked to the passage of time without the sentence being carried out in the conditions established by the law.. Even the statute of limitations for civil action exercised in criminal proceedings follows different rules and must not be confused with the statute of limitations for the crime. Particular attention must also be paid to the case in which a first degree conviction occurs. The termination of the course of the limitation period provided for by art. 161-to c.p. it does not mean that the passage of time becomes irrelevant in every respect. The appeal judgment remains subject to the rules on duration established by the art. 344-twice c.p.p. for the proceedings to which this regulation applies. The function of inadmissibility is therefore different from that of prescription: the first operates as a time limit on the continuation of the process in the appeal phases, while the second determines the extinction of the crime due to the passage of time. The distinction has also been reiterated by the most recent jurisprudence of legitimacy. A further element to consider concerns the effects of the statute of limitations in criminal proceedings. When the crime is extinguished by statute of limitations, the judge must verify the existence of the conditions established by law e, in particular, the relationship between the extinct cause and the possible possibility of pronouncing a sentence of acquittal on the merits pursuant to art.. 129 c.p.p. The issue is particularly delicate because the statute of limitations does not equate to a positive finding of the accused's innocence, but it constitutes a cause for the extinction of the crime based on the passage of time. In the presence of an extinct cause, however, the judge must verify whether it clearly emerges from the documents that the fact does not exist, that the accused did not commit it, that the act does not constitute a crime or that it is not foreseen by law as a crime, in accordance with the provisions of the art. 129 c.p.p. The relationship between the statute of limitations and the acquittal sentence therefore constitutes an independent issue with respect to the simple calculation of the time limit. The statute of limitations may also take on particular importance in proceedings relating to crimes prosecutable upon complaint. The fact that the offended person has a deadline to file a complaint must not be confused with the statute of limitations for the crime. The complaint represents a condition of admissibility and must be filed within the deadline set by the art. 124 c.p., except for specific exceptions established by law, while the statute of limitations concerns the extinction of the crime due to the passage of time. The two institutions can therefore operate on different levels and must be verified separately. Even in the case of defamation, eg, the deadline for filing a complaint and the limitation period do not coincide and respond to different needs. In judicial practice, the prescription therefore requires a true chronological reconstruction of the procedure. It is often useful to prepare a table in which to indicate the date of commission of the crime, the ordinary term, interruptive acts, suspension periods, any sentences that have occurred, the starting and ending dates of any suspension periods e, for proceedings subject to art. 344-Twice c.p.p., the relevant dates for calculating the duration of the appeal proceedings. Only through such a reconstruction is it possible to avoid errors, especially in long-lasting proceedings characterized by numerous postponements and a plurality of procedural documents. The subject has become even more complex precisely due to the succession of different disciplines. The Court of Cassation clarified that, for crimes committed between 3 August 2017 and the 31 December 2019, the regime of the Orlando law applies, while for crimes committed from 1 January 2020 the system operates in which the limitation period ceases with the first instance sentence and the subsequent course of the appeal proceedings is regulated, for proceedings falling within the time frame established by law, through the inadmissibility referred to in the art. 344-twice c.p.p. It follows that, especially in dating proceedings, it is not possible to automatically apply the rules currently in force without first verifying the date of the crime. In fact, the date of commission of the crime represents the first data that must be acquired when proceeding with the calculation of the statute of limitations. The identification of the applicable discipline depends on it, Consequently, the set of rules relating to the effective date, to suspension, to the interruption and termination of the term. In conclusion, the statute of limitations for the crime cannot be reduced to the simple formula according to which, a certain number of years have passed, the crime is extinguished. The institute requires a complex assessment in which the type of crime must be coordinated, the statutory penalty, the date of consumption, the applicable time regime, any causes of suspension and interruption, the procedural documents that took place e, for crimes subject to the regime introduced from 1 January 2020, the relationship between the termination of the statute of limitations after the first instance sentence and the possible inadmissibility of the appeal proceedings pursuant to art.. 344-twice c.p.p. Knowledge of the statute of limitations therefore takes on central importance both for the defense of the accused and for the activity of the judicial authority and legal practitioners., but its calculation must always be carried out on the individual procedure and on the basis of the concretely applicable legislation. In a matter in which also a different qualification of the date of consumption, a period of suspension not considered or an interruptive act incorrectly evaluated can significantly change the final result, the prescription must be approached not as a simple arithmetic calculation, but as a true legal and chronological reconstruction of the entire procedure.